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4.1  Ideological Change and the Growth of the Federal Bureaucracy 
The major turning point in the growth of the federal government was, of 
course, the New Deal. A host of programs were added that in themselves ac- 
count for a substantial share of the growth of government in the twentieth cen- 
tury, and the propensity to add new programs increased. The New Deal was 
the result of a unique concatenation of forces: the unprecedented magnitude of 
the contraction, the political accident that the party favoring bigger government 
was out of power when the contraction began, and the unique personalities of 
Hoover and Roosevelt were among the most important. 
Moreover, as many historians of the Great Depression have recognized, there 
was an important ideological factor in the equation: intellectuals had already 
been converted to the cause of an expanded federal sector. It is hard, of course, 
to be certain about the role of this factor. But there were earlier crises, in the 
1830s and especially the 1890s, that were also severe in terms of  depressed 
incomes and unemployment. Ideology, and in particular the ideology dominant 
among intellectuals and opinion makers, appears to be a good candidate expla- 
nation for the failure of earlier crises to produce a change in the role of govern- 
ment of the same order that occurred in the 1930s. 
While it is easy to see that there was an ideological shift-from  widespread 
skepticism about the ability of the central government to improve the function- 
ing of the economy to widespread faith in the competence of government-it 
is harder to see what produced it. To  shed additional light on the ideological 
preconditions for the New Deal, I will explore the attitude of economists to- 
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ward government intervention in the decade preceding the depression. As it 
turns out, virtually all of the reforms adopted in the 1930s-minimum  wages, 
social  security,  unemployment  compensation,  the  Civilian  Conservation 
Corps, and so on-had  been championed by economists. When the depression 
came, moreover, economists played a major role in bringing their reforms into 
being by writing the legislation, testifying in support of it before Congress, and 
implementing the new programs (Barber 1996). 
What had persuaded the intellectual descendants of Adam Smith to favor 
Big Government? One answer was given by George Stigler in his famous essay 
“The Economist and the State.” Stigler argued that economists had switched 
their support first from mercantilism to laissez-faire and then from laissez-faire 
to Big Government without any discernible reasons! Economists should have 
based their support for or opposition to government intervention on empirical 
studies of the effects of intervention, but they had failed to do so. As usual, its 
better to let George say it: “The economic role of  the state has managed to 
hold the attention of  scholars for over two centuries without arousing their 
curiosity” (Stigler [1965] 1986, 11 1). 
Here, however, I will argue that on the eve of the New Deal American econo- 
mists believed that there was an abundance of empirical evidence from experi- 
ments in Germany, Scandinavia, and (especially) English-speaking countries 
proving that an expanded role for government would work well. The studies 
based on those experiments would not satisfy modern standards of rigor, cer- 
tainly not Stigler’s, and their authors, with a few exceptions, have been forgot- 
ten. But the quantity and consistent thrust of those studies, I believe, moved 
the profession toward support of the modern mixed economy. In other words, 
I will argue that the New Deal was just what the doctors (of economics) or- 
dered and that they believed their advice was soundly based on the clinical evi- 
dence. 
Liberal economists were only one small part of the intellectual support for 
an expanded federal sector that was in place before the depression. It is con- 
ceivable that events would have unfolded along lines similar to what actually 
transpired even if the economists had remained loyal to Adam Smith, although 
there might have been many differences in the details. My  hope is that by 
looking at what persuaded economists to support the New Deal we may find a 
clue to the arguments that were broadly persuasive. 
Before turning to the economists, however, I want to take a closer look at 
just how important the programs created by the New Deal were to the growth 
of the federal government in the 1930s and beyond. 
4.2  The New Deal and the Expansion of the Federal Government 
It is a commonplace that the growth of government power cannot be mea- 
sured merely by looking at the number of federal employees or the amount of 
money they  spend. To  take what  is perhaps the most  extreme example, a 
change in the membership of  the Supreme Court can permanently alter the 127  The Expansion of the Federal Government in the 1930s 
effective role of government, even though quantitative measures of the size of 
government are unchanged. Typically, economists note this problem and then 
discuss employment and spending on the feeble grounds that these are the only 
statistics available, a procedure I shall follow. However, I can plead in my de- 
fense that the portrait of the growth of the federal government that results from 
looking at the quantitative data is consistent with portraits drawn on the basis 
of  qualitative data such as changes in the legal system, for example, Higgs 
(1987) and Hughes (1991). 
4.2.1  The Federal Labor Force 
The ratio of federal employees (excluding the military and the postal ser- 
vice) to the total civilian labor force is plotted in figure 4.1. This series shows 
a dramatic upward ratchet in the 1930s and a second upward ratchet in the 
1940s. A good part of the World War I1 ratchet, however, is to be found in the 
Veterans Administration. When employees of the Veterans Administration are 
excluded (the lower line) the wartime ratchet drops by one-half. The remaining 
World War I1 ratchet, moreover, is lost in the postwar period. By  the end of 
the 1980s the federal labor force share is back to where it was at the end of 
the 1930s. 
Was the expansion of the federal labor force in the 1930s mostly the result 
of adding new agencies or expanding old agencies? Skepticism about the mo- 
tives of  bureaucrats might lead us to expect that it was older agencies that 
expanded the most. In  the expansive atmosphere that prevailed in the early 
days of the New Deal, we would expect bureaucrats in established agencies to 
try to increase their workforces. The established bureaus would try to formu- 
late plans to fight the depression calling for more employees, plans that would 
be funded during the emergency because the Congress was controlled by legis- 
lators favorable to  an expansion. Later, the  inherent inertia in government 
would prevent conservative legislators from removing all of the workers and 
canceling all of the new programs added during the emergency. Porter (1980) 
asserted that this happened during World War 11; and it would not be unreason- 
able to think that it also happened during the depression. 
Figure 4.2 provides a test. I divided federal agencies into three categories: 
(1) New Deal agencies (the Works Progress Administration, the Federal De- 
posit Insurance Corporation, and so on), (2)  old agencies that produced a final 
product (the Post Office, Veterans Administration, and so on), and (3) old agen- 
cies that produced intermediate services (the Treasury Department, Govern- 
ment Printing Office, and so on). The assumption is that since the demand for 
the services of category 3 was derived partly from the new agencies, we would 
expect the agencies in category 3 to expand during the depression, even in the 
absence of an exploitation of the emergency by the bureaucracy. 
Figure 4.2 displays the annual increase in employment in each category from 
1934 to 1938. Civilians working for the military and emergency workers hired 
by  the Civilian Conservation Corps are excluded. Two features stand out. First, 
the increase in the federal labor force was concentrated in 1934 and 1935. By 128  Hugh Rockoff 
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Fig. 4.1  Federal civilian employment, 1908-90  (percentage of civilian 
labor force) 
Sources: US.  Bureau of the Census, Historical  Statistics of  the United States, Colonial Times to 
1970 (Washington, D.C.,  1975).  series D4, D14, Y308, and Y313; and the continuations of these 
series reported in U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract ofthe United States (Washington, 
D.C., various issues). 
Note: Dashed line shows employment excluding the Veterans Administration (VA). 
1936 the expansion was over. In that year, there was little net change in the size 
of  the government labor force; instead, what we see is an absorption by tradi- 
tional agencies of  some of  the agencies created in the first years of the New 
Deal. Indeed, one can say that the increase in the share of the labor force work- 
ing for the federal government in the twentieth century is basically the product 
of 1934 and 1935. 
Second, the increase was dominated by  employees hired by  new  agencies 
(category l),  or by existing agencies that could claim an increase in the derived 
demand for their services (category 3). 129  The Expansion of the Federal Government in the 1930s 
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Fig. 4.2  Increases in the federal labor force by type of agency, 1934-38 
Source: US.  Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of  the United States (Washington, D.C., 
1939),  table 166, p. 157. 
Notes: The figure plots changes from one year to the next. “Old (final product)” agencies include 
the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Interior, Labor, State, and War, the Navy, the Panama 
Canal, the Post Office, the Veterans Administration, and smaller agencies. “Old (intermediate)” 
agencies include the Civil Service Commission, the Departments of Justice and Treasury, the Gen- 
eral Accounting Office, and smaller agencies. “New Deal” agencies include the Agricultural Ad- 
justment Administration, Civil Aeronautics Authority, Farm Credit Administration, Federal De- 
posit Insurance Corporation, Federal Emergency Administration of  Public Works, Home Owners 
Loan Corporation, Reconstruction Finance Corporation, Social Security Board, Tennessee Valley 
Authority, Works hogress Administration, Department of Agriculture Emergency Conservation 
Work, and smaller agencies. Emergency workers are excluded. 
Existing bureaus producing final products, however, were able to benefit 
when they could formulate acceptable plans or happened to be  in the right 
place at the right time. Employment at the Post Office, for example, increased 
only 6.2 percent between 1933 and 1938; but employment at the Veterans Ad- 
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Fig. 4.3  Federal civilian spending, 1900-90  (percentage of GNP) 
Sources: US.  Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics of  the United States, Colonial Times to 
1970 (Washington, D.C.,  1975), series Y463, Y466-Y469,  Y472-Y474,  Y476, Y485, Y494; and 
the continuations of these series reported in U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the 
United Srates (Washington, D.C., various issues). 
Note:  To  go from total federal spending to federal civilian spending, deductions were made for 
spending by the military services and the Veterans Administration, for spending on international 
affairs, and for interest on federal debt incurred during wars. 
4.2.2  Federal Spending 
Figure 4.3 is a version of the familiar plot of total civilian spending as a 
percentage of GNP. In this case, in addition to deducting military expenditures 
from total outlays, I have  also deducted expenditures on veterans’ benefits, 
international affairs, and interest on the national debt incurred during the world 
wars and the Korean War. The goal was to get a measure of civilian spending 
as free as possible from war-related spending. Obviously, these adjustments 
could be refined: not all expenditures on international affairs are defense re- 
lated, and my adjustments for interest incurred in wartime were relatively sim- 131  The Expansion of the Federal Government in the 1930s 
ple. But  the broad picture resulting from alternative adjustments would  be 
similar. 
The spending data, like the employment data, show a sharp upward ratchet 
during the New  Deal. Then there is a decline in the ratio during the  1940s, 
produced by  the  elimination of  emergency relief  programs and  the  rapid 
growth of the economy. Despite this decline, the ratio is substantially higher 
in the postwar years than it was before. The difference between the employ- 
ment and spending plots lies in the period after 1950. Spending as a percentage 
of  GNP continues to rise at a fairly rapid rate until the 1980s, driven mainly 
by  the expansion of  New  Deal transfer programs (the most important being 
social security) and by  the addition of transfer programs (the most important 
being Medicare and Medicaid) during the Little New Deal of the 1960s. The 
spending data, to sum up, suggest that the New Deal created an upward ratchet 
in both the level and rate of growth of the share of federal spending in GNP. 
Again we can ask whether the increase in spending in the 1930s was concen- 
trated in the new programs or whether it was  spread throughout the govern- 
ment. In this case, as in the case of employment, New Deal agencies accounted 
for the bulk of the increase. I then divided civilian spending into five catego- 
ries: (1) unemployment relief, which was new and was carried out mainly by 
new  agencies such as the Civilian Conservation Corps; (2) pensions, which 
includes both new programs such as social security and older programs such 
as veterans’ benefits that were expanded during the emergency; (3) spending 
on public works, which was camed out by  new agencies and by  a number of 
older agencies; (4) spending on agricultural relief, which was carried on by 
new agencies that were quickly scooped up by the Department of Agriculture; 
and (5) all other spending, which includes mostly programs that existed prior 
to the depression. The lines in figure 4.4 show the difference between civilian 
spending in each year and spending in 193  1. 
Evidently, relief expenditures (unemployment and agriculture) were the ma- 
jor source of  increased spending in the  1930s. Even as late as  1942, relief 
expenditures are the largest source of the increase over 193  1. Public works- 
to some extent another form of relief-were  important in the middle years of 
the depression but were cut back sharply as the economy improved at the end 
of  the decade and military construction increased. Pensions, although they 
would be the major spending legacy, are important mainly in the years when 
veterans’ bonuses were paid. Traditional programs (all other) show relatively 
little growth in the 1930s, and some of this growth could be viewed as derived 
from the growth of the relief agencies. 
All in all, the message here is similar to the message in the employment 
graphs: the federal government increased in size because it increased in scope. 
The hard question is, Why did the scope of the federal government increase so 


















Fig. 4.4  Increase in federal civilian expenditures from 1931 levels 
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Budget, Budget  for 1942 (Washington, D.C., 1942),  table 8, p. 1046. 
4.3  The Economists and the State, from World War I to 1929 
The New Deal, as noted in the introduction, resulted from a unique concate- 
nation of forces (see Higgs 1987, 170-71;  Hughes 1991, 140-42):  (1) the ma- 
jor factor, of course, was the sheer fury of the contraction-twenty-five  percent 
unemployment created a not-to-be-denied demand that somebody do some- 
thing; (2) the accident that the party generally favoring bigger government was 
out of power when the contraction began-The  depression of the 1890s, by 
way of contrast, weakened the Democrats and strengthened the Republicans; 
(3) the personality of Hoover, who was unable to communicate  his concern for 
the suffering produced by  the depression, and the personality of  Roosevelt, 
who proved to be a masterful tactician and strategist on behalf of an expanded 
role for government; and (4) the previous conversion of intellectuals to a favor- 
able opinion of government intervention in the economy. 
As noted in the introduction, it is with respect to item 4 that I hope to shed 133  The Expansion of the Federal Government in the 1930s 
some additional light by  looking at the attitude of economists in the years lead- 
ing up to 1932 toward the reforms that became the New Deal. 
Why is it important to look at what economists believed and how they came 
to those beliefs? In ordinary times, it is true, the opinions of economists got 
short shrift. Over 1,000 economists, including almost all the leading econo- 
mists,  signed  a  petition  against the  Smoot-Hawley tariff  (Dorfman  1959, 
674)-to  no avail. But in the unique circumstances created by the depression 
the ideas of economists became important. Many of the new programs, includ- 
ing the Civilian Conservation Corps, unemployment insurance, and minimum 
wages, were advocated and shaped by economists. 
It is important, moreover, to learn what persuaded economists that these 
programs would work because the evidence that persuaded them was probably 
broadly persuasive. Other groups of intellectuals were, if anything, even more 
enthusiastic than economists. Social workers, for example, were enthusiastic 
and influential advocates of  social insurance (Berkowitz and McQuaid 1992, 
38-39).  But precisely because economists were the heirs of an intellectual tra- 
dition that took laissez-faire seriously, the arguments that convinced them that 
government intervention would be beneficial were likely to have been espe- 
cially potent. 
4.3.1 
There is no justification at all for viewing the economists in the 1920s as 
doctrinaire defenders of  laissez-faire. That view is easily rejected by  even a 
cursory study of the history of economic thought prior to the New Deal. Pro- 
fessional opinion, it is true, varied from subdiscipline to subdiscipline. 
Macroeconomists, typically, were more conservative. The gold standard was 
generally accepted as the best long-run monetary framework. Even in the case 
of macroeconomics, however, there was considerable support for spending on 
public works to cure cyclical unemployment (Blaug 1978, 684-86).  Chicago 
economists-Jacob  Viner, Henry Simons, Paul Douglas, and Aaron Director, 
among others-were  particularly vociferous about the need to create employ- 
ment in the early 1930s through public works programs (Davis 1968; Tavlas 
1976; Rockoff 1996).' Nevertheless, it is fair to say that the Keynesian revolu- 
tion was to a great extent a product of the 1930s.' 
Keynesian economics, in turn, had a major impact on the structure of  the 
debate over new government programs. Before the Keynesian revolution, advo- 
cates of a new program had to overcome the argument that taxes would have 
Just What the Doctor Ordered 
1.  Although a number of leading economists favored deficit-financed public works, they did not 
agree on why public works would reduce unemployment. Douglas, e.g., argued simply that the 
direct effect of employing additional workers was unlikely to be offset by any plausible employ- 
ment decreases in the private sector. Simons argued from the quantity theory of money: deficits 
meant more cash (or more bonds, which were practically money) and hence more total spending. 
2. Stein (1969) and Barber (1996) describe the evolution of macroeconomic thought in the de- 
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to be raised to pay for the new program and someone would have to consume 
less private goods. After the Keynesian revolution, the cost of a new program 
became (except in the special case of full employment) zero or negative. 
Among microeconomists, the major focus in this paper, however, there was 
considerably more support for an expanded role for government before the 
depre~sion.~  At the far end of  the spectrum from the macroeconomists were 
the labor economists, who “characteristically were among the staunch advo- 
cates of an expanded program of  social insurance” (Dorfman 1959, 592). In 
general, as Dorfman shows, microeconomists championed a long list of re- 
forms such as  minimum wages, employment exchanges, old-age pensions, 
publicly owned regional power utilities, and so on: the programs that became 
the enduring achievements of the New Deal. 
One piece of evidence for this generalization is explored below: the over- 
whelming majority of  the articles on New Deal-type  reforms published in ma- 
jor economic journals between World War I and 1929 were favorable. We can 
conclude, confidently, that there was a large and active group of economists 
who favored New  Deal reforms. The extent to which their arguments were 
persuasive with the remainder of the profession, the silent majority, is less cer- 
tain. But as McCloskey (1994, 71-84)  has argued, persuasion is itself an eco- 
nomic activity. Economists invested considerable time and effort in these stud- 
ies over several decades. It is reasonable to believe that they persisted because 
they earned an adequate return on their investment. In any case, I will show 
that any economist who claimed to be guided by the evidence reported in the 
major journals would have been forced to conclude that the New  Deal was 
made up of a valuable group of workable programs. 
For the most part economists did not try to make the case for reform by 
relying on theoretical arguments. Even A. C. Pigou, who developed the con- 
cept of externalities into a formidable weapon for criticizing unfettered compe- 
tition, and whose book The Economics of  Welfare (1932) advocated most of the 
programs that were adopted in the 1930s, relied to a great extent on empirical 
evidence and “common sense” to make his case for a mixed economy. 
Where did this empirical evidence come from? Before World War I, social 
insurance plans had been advocated on the basis of German models (Skocpol 
1992, 160-76); but after the war the German experiments became the basis for 
labeling social insurance plans as foreign and subversive (Dorfman 1959, 11 l), 
so other examples had to be used. Some radical economists were strongly in- 
fluenced by the U.S. experience in World War I. Rexford Tugwell, for example, 
thought that the War Industries Board had made the industrial economy per- 
3. In an important book, Socializing Security, which came to my attention too late for me to 
incorporate its findings into this paper, David A. Moss (1996) discusses the American Association 
for Labor Legislation. Many of the economists mentioned below played a key role in the associa- 
tion, which vigorously promoted a range of measures intended to improve the security of  workers. 
This paper complements Moss’s work by  examining the arguments for the feasibility of  reform 
that the enthusiasts of  reform found persuasive and with which they hoped to persuade their pro- 
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form like a “well oiled machine” and had “compressed ten years of economic 
progress into one.” Or to take a more mainstream example, Frank W.  Taussig 
in a famous paper in the Quarterly Journal  of Economics (1921) asked “Is 
Market Price Determinate?’  His experience on the price-fixing committee of 
the War Industries Board convinced him that the answer was no: there was a 
range of prices acceptable to the market, and hence scope for positive govern- 
ment intervention. 
Tugwell, like other radicals, was  also strongly  influenced by  the Soviet 
Union. During the  1920s he returned from a visit appalled by  the political 
persecution but at the same time convinced that in central planning the Soviets 
were onto a good idea (Dorfman 1959,509-10). 
And some economists must have been influenced in their thinking about the 
welfare state by  the experiments and writings of progressive employers such 
as Edward Filene and Gerald Swope. Certainly, progressive employers had an 
influence on politicians and policymakers, as documented by  Berkowitz and 
McQuaid (1992). 
But to judge from the major journals, American economists, typically, were 
not easily persuaded by experiments that held so little constant. For them, the 
most telling experiments were run in peacetime in economies similar to that 
of  the United States. If  need be, an experiment undertaken on the European 
continent, particularly in Germany, would do. But best, to judge from the jour- 
nals, was an experiment in an English-speaking country: at the national, state, 
or local levels in the United States, Canada, Britain, Australia, or New Zealand. 
4.3.2  The Evidence Supporting Intervention 
To illustrate these points I will review a number of New Deal reforms and 
the evidence that economists believed they had that these reforms would be 
beneficial. I chose reforms, such as minimum wages, that could be challenged 
using fairly simple economic analysis, such as supply and demand curves. 
These would be the reforms, presumably, that would meet the most profes- 
sional resistance. I have steered clear (for the most part) of monetary and fiscal 
policy because those issues are being covered in other chapters; and I have 
steered clear of antitrust because the attitude of the New Deal toward antitrust 
was ambiguous and its legacy limited. 
The articles (mainly in the American Economic Review,  the Quarterly Jour- 
nal of Economics, and the Journal of Political Economy)  and books discussed 
below had a very different rhetorical structure from their modem  counterpart^.^ 
Typically, these articles focused on institutional details: who supported and 
who opposed reform, when laws were passed, what the content of the law was, 
what the penalties were for violating it, and so forth. Occasionally, some at- 
tempt at quantitative assessment was made, say by  making a before-and-after 
4. I will focus mainly on articles published between the end of World War I and 1929, but in a 
number of cases I discuss articles from before the war that appeared to have been especially influ- 
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comparison, but often a conclusion about the success of  the law  would be 
drawn without any explicit supporting evidence. The logic was that the author, 
having shown his extensive familiarity with the experiment, should be trusted. 
There were only a handful of attempts, among the articles I examined, to use 
statistical techniques to hold other things constant. 
The Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), 1933. What evidence was there that the 
government could successfully manage a huge regional power project? 
One could always cite the Prussian railroads, an example that had apparently 
become, for socialists, the classic example of successful government manage- 
ment of a large-scale enterprise (Marshall 1907,23). Taussig (1924,431) cites 
the German post office, telegraph and telephone, railways (perhaps), and mili- 
tary organization (unmistakably) as examples of public enterprises that were 
well managed.5  Only in Switzerland,  however, does Taussig see (possibly)  pub- 
lic industry with “a spirit of progress comparable to that of private industry.” 
Taussig also makes his point by reference to Australia? “He who compares, 
for example, the railways of the United States and Australia will undoubtedly 
find some serious defects in Australia. But he will find crying evils in  the 
United States. He will find greater efficiency in our country, but also tortuous 
management, and ominous consequences in the greater inequality of wealth; 
and he will not render an unhesitating verdict against the state railways of Aus- 
tralia” (1924, 434). 
The evidence most directly relevant to the TVA  concerned the Ontario 
Power Commission, a publicly owned company that sold electricity generated 
at Niagara Falls. Emerson Biggar (1921) presented a comparison of the On- 
tario Power Commission with privately owned companies in New York in the 
Journal of  Political  Economy. Biggar was adamant that public ownership in 
Canada had proved superior to private ownership in New York State. Biggar 
even offered a shred of quantitative evidence: rates for electricity were lower 
in Toronto, which was 90 miles from the falls, than in Buffalo, which was 
closer, or even in the city of Niagara itself (1921, 5  1-52). 
Biggar also noted that the Ontario Power Commission had promoted rural 
electrification,  while a private power company that supplied an area near Niag- 
ara known as “the garden of Canada” refused to supply farmers with electricity 
(1921, 52-53). The precedent here for the TVA and for the Rural Electrifica- 
tion Administration (1935) is obvious. 
Eight years later H. W.  Peck (1929), armed with far more quantitative data, 
returned to the comparison in a paper presented at the annual meetings of  the 
American Economic Association. Peck showed that production costs per kilo- 
watt hour were slightly lower in Ontario, although similar to production costs 
5.  Taussig wrote frequently on Germany and railroads, and in one case (1894) on the Prussian 
railroads, a piece in which he evaluated a German pamphlet critical of certain administrative pol- 
icies. 
6. Schumpeter says that Taussig’s Principles “will help us appraise ‘what students got’ at  that 
time,” although Schumpeter probably had economic theory in mind (1974,871). 137  The Expansion of the Federal Government in the 1930s 
for a comparable group of utilities in New York, while prices charged to con- 
sumers of electricity were substantially lower in Canada. Peck then considered 
several possible explanations for  the difference. Taxes, for example, were 
higher for the New York utilities, and interest costs were lower for the Ontario 
Power Commission, possibly because the Canadian government guaranteed 
the bonds. But these differences could account for only a fraction of the differ- 
ence in costs to consumers. 
In  the end Peck concluded that  public  ownership had  proved  better  all 
around for consumers in Canada mainly because the philosophy that guided 
the Ontario Power Commission was service to the public, rather than maximiz- 
ing profits. His discussant, J. Bauer (1929), offered no objection. Bauer’s main 
point was that the regulatory system in the United States could probably be 
reformed and made sufficiently effective to eliminate most of  the advantage 
from public ownership. 
R. L. Dewey  (1931) addressed the issue two years later in another paper 
presented at the annual meetings. Dewey did not undertake the detailed com- 
parison of rates that Peck had performed. He cited, however, the Ontario-New 
York comparison, and a number of other cases in which publicly owned munic- 
ipal power companies in the United States competed with privately owned 
companies, to show that public ownership produced lower rates. 
One swallow doesn’t make a summer. John Maurice Clark (1926,422),  who 
cited the Ontario system among the successes of public ownership (along with 
the Glasgow  street railway system and, of  course, the Prussian railways),’ 
claimed that the Ontario Power Commission owed much of its success to one 
engineer who was in charge during its formative years, Sir Adam Beck. Clark 
concluded that while examples such as the Ontario Power Commission showed 
that public ownership was not necessarily disastrous, general considerations, 
such as the absence of  a profit motive to hold down costs, suggested that one 
should make haste slowly with public ownership. 
But the point I want to emphasize here is that there was no rejoinder to 
Biggar and Peck, and while other examples of successful government-owned 
and -operated utilities were reported in the major journals, there were few ex- 
amples of failures.8  An economist who claimed to base his or her opinion on 
the evidence reported in the leading journals would have been forced to con- 
clude that the empirical evidence supported public o~nership.~ 
7. Biggar (1917) compared private and public railroads in Canada, arguing that public railroads 
had proved superior because they had provided more honest administration, lower rates, and less 
legislative corruption. 
8. Paul Douglas (1921) investigated the purchase of the Seattle street railway system by the city. 
This case had been cited in the press as an example of the folly of public ownership because the 
city had been forced to raise fares. But Douglas concluded that “the city has probably done as 
well or better than any private company would have done” (1921,47). 
9. During the 1920s there was a major controversy in New York  over the development of power 
sites along the St. Lawrence, the controversy that had motivated Peck‘s study. Governor Roosevelt 
had strongly supported public development. 138  Hugh Rockoff 
The minimum wage, 1938. The minimum wage is a particularly good test of 
the attitude of economists toward intervention. What evidence was there that 
minimum wages would work? 
Lots! Harvard professor Arthur Holcombe’s (1910) article in the Quarterly 
Journal of  Economics discussed the British Act of 1909 and noted that it was 
modeled on the successful law of the province of Victoria in Australia, and he 
expressed the hope that a minimum wage law would soon be adopted in the 
United States. His 1912 article in the American Economic Review cited experi- 
ments in Victoria, New South Wales, Great Britain, Minnesota, Wisconsin, and 
Massachusetts. There was no mistaking the conclusion: “Some immediate pro- 
tection,  however,  for the American  standard  of  living  is necessary  and  an 
appropriate means  is the  establishment  of  a  minimum  wage”  (Holcombe 
1912,37). 
Sidney Webb’s (1912) article in the Journal of  Political Economy, “The Eco- 
nomic Theory of  a Legal Minimum Wage,” was also, as you might expect, 
extremely enthusiastic. The title is misleading. The article is essentially a pre- 
sentation of the case for minimum wages based on the Australian experience:’O 
“In this matter of the Legal Minimum Wage the sixteen years’ actual trial in 
Victoria is full of instruction. . . . In the five sweated trades to which the law 
was first applied sixteen years ago, wages have gone up from 12 to 35 per 
cent, the hours of labor have invariably been reduced, and the actual number 
of persons employed, far from falling, has in all cases, relatively to the total 
population, greatly increased’ (973). 
How did minimum wages produce such positive results? One of Webb’s cen- 
tral arguments had a modem ring to it: minimum wages forced workers to 
augment their human capital. “The young workman, knowing that he cannot 
secure a preference for employment by offering to put up with worse condi- 
tions than the standard, seeks to commend himself by a good character, techni- 
cal skill, and general intelligence” (1912,979). 
Three years later Edith Abbott (1915) provided a largely factual, but clearly 
positive description of British minimum wage laws in the Journal of  Political 
Economy. After the war, Kathleen Derry and Paul Douglas (1922) reported on 
the minimum wage laws (for women) in Canada, again in the Journal of  Politi- 
cal Economy. Much of the article was descriptive. One section, on British Co- 
lumbia, however, provided what modem economists would recognize as an 
elementary “events study.” Deny and Douglas showed that wages for women 
increased, that the minimum wage did not become a maximum, that the distri- 
bution of wages was compressed, and that the employment of  minors did not 
increase in the wake of the law. 
They did not comment explicitly on the decrease in hours worked, equally 
10. Webb’s  article was followed immediately in the journal  by  an article by  Florence Kelly 
(1912) of  the National Consumers’s League that  described the current state of  minimum wage 
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apparent in their data. Implicitly, they seemed to be suggesting that the de- 
crease in hours worked could have been prevented by a proposed regulation 
(which was disallowed by  the courts) that would have forced payment of the 
minimum wage on a weekly basis, even if the employee only worked part time 
(Derry and Douglas 1922, 168). The possibility that this regulation would lead 
to employment at a lower wage in an uncovered sector, or unemployment, was 
not addressed. 
Other reports,  such  as  Douglas (1919), Lucas (1924), and  Feis  (1926), 
tended to be mostly descriptive, but they shared a favorable view of the effects 
of  minimum wages. Lucas described Massachusetts’s experiment and con- 
cluded that despite weaknesses that could be corrected by making the law man- 
datory, “it is apparent that the Massachusetts law has done much to ameliorate 
the condition of working women” (1924, 50). There is no suggestion of any 
negative effects. Aryness Joy described the state of Washington’s  experiment 
and concluded that “it has, of course, with all its limitations, been a great gain” 
(1926,714). 
The last article about minimum wages to appear in a major journal before 
the depression was by G. V. Portus (1929) in the American Economic Review. 
Writing with the authority of  a professor at the University of  Sydney, Portus 
provided a critical history of  labor market regulation in Australia. Although 
noting a number of problems-for  example, that regulation had tended to “ste- 
reotype” wages-he  found more to praise. Wage  regulation had eliminated 
“sweating,” had maintained real wages at close to their prewar level during the 
war and its aftermath, and had increased real wages since that time. His policy 
conclusion was that wage regulation should be carried out at the national level 
rather than at the provincial level. 
Pigou’s Economics of  Welfare (1932) devoted considerable space to mini- 
mum wages and the lessons to be learned from various experiments. The first 
question he addressed was whether evasion will be so persuasive that regula- 
tion is rendered ineffective. Pigou concluded that minimum wage regulation 
can be successful. The argument is that violations can be detected and that 
governments have a variety of powerful sanctions that can be brought to bear 
against those who violate the act. To illustrate Pigou cited a range of sanctions 
employed in wartime British legislation, and from legislation in Australia and 
the United States ([1932] 1962, 537-40). 
Pigou argued, however, that minimum wages would reduce real GDP by 
driving some workers to lower wage occupations. Interestingly, he drew atten- 
tion to a weakness of the Australian analogue ([  19321 1962,603). In Australia 
agriculture was still the largest sector. Workers displaced by minimum wages 
in the industrial sector could find work in the agricultural sector without sig- 
nificantly driving down wages. This was unlikely in Britain, where the agricul- 
tural sector could not easily absorb displaced industrial workers. 
What about the argument that minimum wages will force workers to aug- 
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he said, from the fact, for example, that people who move from low-wage to 
high-wage districts are soon earning the high wage: the more able workers 
choose to migrate. What is needed is a natural experiment. He cited the im- 
provements in the quality of the men drafted in the war and, more to the point, 
some wartime British experiments with minimum wages in tailoring and box 
making as hopeful signs, but he did not consider these experiments adequate 
to clinch the case ([I9321 1962,608-9). 
In the end, Pigou provided a relatively modest endorsement for a national 
minimum wage. It  will lower national income, and it will lower total labor 
income from wages. But ifthere is an adequate system of government support 
for the unemployed-his  own favorite was a national minimum standard of 
income-then  total labor income, including both the wages of those employed 
and the transfers received by those left unemployed, might be higher than in 
the absence of a national minimum wage, and that outcome would justify the 
policy ([1932] 1962, 692-93). 
The Securities and Exchange Commission, 1934. What evidence was there that 
the government could regulate successfully the issue of securities? In this case, 
there were studies that pointed out difficulties with government intervention. 
In the end, however, most, although not all, of the studies argued for regulation 
by  a government bureau in Washington. 
Emil Friend (1908), writing in the Journal of  Political Economy, discussed 
German stock exchange regulation. It was one of  the most negative assess- 
ments of  regulation to appear in the journals before the depression. Friend 
conceded that the German regulations were a response to genuine abuses: at- 
tempts to comer the grain market. But he concluded that speculation is inevita- 
ble in security markets and that attempts to curb it are likely in the long run to 
do more harm than good. Other discussions of security regulation focused on 
American experiments, and although some of these articles noted problems, 
they usually endorsed more regulation. 
E. T. Miller (1907) discussed the Texas Stock and Bond Law passed in 1893, 
which regulated the sale of railroad securities. Miller thought that the system 
had  discouraged investment in  improvements. His  major recommendation, 
however, was not an abandonment of the system, but an increase in the fares 
charged by railroads, which were also regulated in Texas. 
James W.  Angell (1920) in a paper in the Journal of  Political Economy re- 
ported, somewhat hastily one would think, on the results of the Illinois Blue 
Sky Law  passed in June  1919. It was not an empirical study in the typical 
modem sense-there  were no statistics; instead, it was based mainly on inter- 
views and correspondence with regulators, security dealers, and so on. Angell 
was not happy with the results of the Blue Sky Law. He worried that economic 
development might be reduced and that fraud would not be reduced. He viewed 
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phasis on punishing securities dealers and its limitation to Illinois. He recom- 
mended a national  law  that  would  control the issue of  securities at  their 
“source” and so prevent, through government supervision, the possibility that 
a fraudulent security would ever be issued. 
William Z. Ripley (1914) covered an impressive range of  evidence in  an 
article in the American Economic Review. His procedure was to cite case after 
case of railway securities regulation, in each case grading the state regulators 
on their performances. Some regulators earned high marks and others failed. 
His policy conclusion was that the state regulatory agencies should be elimi- 
nated in favor of regulation by  (a more powerful) Interstate Commerce Com- 
mission. Moreover, to eliminate state regulation, the commission would have 
to be given powers commensurate with those held by the most powerful state 
regulators. 
The last relevant study published in one of  the major journals before the 
depression (Frederick 1929) looked at the reform that Ripley had advocated; 
at how well the regulation of railway securities by  the Interstate Commerce 
Commission (a power granted in 1920)  had worked in practice. Frederick con- 
cluded that “on the whole, the regulation of railway securities by the Interstate 
Commerce Commission has been beneficial to all [investors,  railways, and con- 
sumers of railway services] concerned” (1929,201).” 
Employment exchanges, 1933. What evidence was there that national employ- 
ment exchanges would improve the allocation of labor? 
There was little discussion in the journals of this question, in part I suspect 
because it was accepted as almost self-evident that the adoption of a nation- 
wide system of publicly owned employment exchanges would improve on the 
existing system that relied mostly on private employment bureaus.IZ  The argu- 
ment was that a public system would not be tempted to defraud job seekers. 
Frankel discussed the German example in the Journal of  Political Economy: 
“In passing the Public Employment Exchange Law of July 13, 1922, Germany 
. . .  has come to have an instrument which, while it cannot of itself create work 
opportunities,  can help minimize greatly the ever present unemployment prob- 
lem” (1924, 207). 
Pigou agreed that employment exchanges should be run by the government. 
“Experience seems to show that, if they are to win an extensive clientele, they 
should be public-not  run as a private speculation by possibly fraudulent pri- 
vate persons” ([1932] 1962, 516). Most of  his analysis was concerned with 
11. Walker  (1 927) criticized securities regulation. It was a “think piece” and did not discuss 
actual experiments with regulation. 
12. Ohio established the first state employment agency in 1890. The federal government estab- 
lished an employment service in 1907 within the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization. After 
1918 it was an independent unit within the Department of Labor. But it was generally regarded as 
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how to create incentives for maximizing their use by potential employers and 
employees ([  19321 1962, 5 12-18).  He considered, in this context, the experi- 
ence of labor exchanges in Britain, France, Germany, and South Africa. 
Bank deposit insurance, 1934. What evidence was there that bank deposit in- 
surance would prevent bank failures? 
Here at last we come to a reform that was not endorsed by economists in the 
1920s on the basis of empirical evidence. There were a number of experiments 
with  state-run deposit guarantee schemes in the early years of  the century. 
Cooke traced the progress of these experiments for the readers of the Quarterly 
Journal  ofEconomics in a half-dozen articles (Cooke 1909-10,  1913, 1915, 
1921, 1924). Surveying the wreckage in his final article, Cooke (1924) consid- 
ered the possibility that the national banking system might be successful where 
the state-run systems had failed because of the comptroller's tradition of close 
and effective supervision. But he shrank from recommending it. The vision of 
the national banking system going down in flames, even if a remote possibility, 
was too much. 
There were, however, no foreign experiments with nationwide deposit insur- 
ance to decide the viability of a nationwide system. (Deposit insurance, in fact, 
reversed the normal process of diffusion: it was the apparent success of  the 
American example that led subsequently to adoptions in other countries.) From 
the vantage point of the 1920s, the possibility remained open that a nationwide 
system-particularly  if it avoided some of the problems of the state systems, 
such as allowing banks to withdraw when large losses and special assessment 
loomed on the horizon-could  be made to work. This possibility was exploited 
by  the proinsurance forces in Congress during the depre~sion.'~  The absence 
of  a strong professional consensus prior to the New  Deal may  explain one 
anomaly. Deposit insurance was the only major New Deal reform that Roose- 
velt opposed (Calomiris and White 1994, 146). 
Unemployment insurance,  1935. How did economists know that unemploy- 
ment insurance financed by  an employer tax would protect workers without 
seriously reducing the incentive to work and bankrupting employers? 
This question is especially pertinent because economists played a major role 
in the enactment of unemployment compensation. The first state unemploy- 
ment insurance act was passed in a special session of the Wisconsin legislature 
in 1932. It was introduced by Harold Groves, a colleague and former student 
of  John R. Commons at the University of Wisconsin. A similar bill, the work 
of  Isaac M. Rubinow, an economist at Ohio State, Paul Douglas, and other 
economists, was introduced at about the same time in the Ohio legislature. The 
Ohio bill, however, was defeated partly because of opposition from employers 
13. See Calomiris and White (1994) for an explanation of how deposit insurance came to be 
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on the grounds that a state plan would leave them at a competitive disadvantage 
(Dorfman 1959,628-29). 
Those economists were activating reforms that a large number of American 
labor economists believed had been shown to be workable by experiments in 
Europe. But this confidence was not centuries old. One of the first discussions 
of unemployment compensation at the annual meetings of the American Eco- 
nomics Association occurred not long  after the  turn of  the  century when 
Charles Tuttle (1902) presented his case for unemployment compensation in a 
paper entitled “The Workman’s Position in the Light of Economic Progress.” 
Tuttle’s paper was devoted almost entirely to establishing the worker’s ethical 
claim to compensation from his employer, and from the state, when the worker 
was unemployed as a result of technological progress. Tuttle suggested, tenta- 
tively, that compensation might take one or more of three forms: (1) “free pub- 
lic employment bureaus” and “perhaps free railroad transportation,” (2) “mak- 
ing the business owner liable to a money damage for the summary dismissal 
of a faithful and efficient workman,” and (3) an “indemnity fund” financed in 
part from “general tax revenue” and in part from “some sort of  special tax” 
upon the entrepreneur (Tuttle 1902,210-11). 
In the tradition of the day, the journal recorded the opinions of eight discus- 
sants. Most sympathized with the ethical case for compensation but worried 
about whether compensation was practical. What would be the effect, for ex- 
ample, on the incentive to work? David Kinley, one of the leading economists 
of  the day,  simply declared that Tuttle’s “proposal would be difficult if  not 
impossible to put into effect” (1902, 218). And William W.  Folwell declared 
the idea “wholly impractical” (1902,230). Several discussants tried to provide 
examples to show that unemployment compensation was practical, but they 
could only come up with rough approximations. Samuel L. Lindsay, for ex- 
ample, pointed to the British “Workingman’s Compensation Act” (for work- 
related injuries) as a possible precedent (1902, 222). 
Perhaps the most interesting try was by John R. Commons, because Com- 
mons would become an influential advocate of unemployment compensation 
in the decades to come. Commons offered an example from “some five or six 
years ago,” when Massachusetts had indemnified workers who lost their jobs 
as the result of a large water project by paying them six months’ wages (1902, 
231). Commons assured his colleagues that the initiative of the workers was 
not undermined in this experiment. He acknowledged, however, that this ex- 
ample was not entirely persuasive, and at the end of his remarks he expressed 
the hope that “if we set about as economists trying to discover practical means 
for indemnifying the laborer I think we can find lessons from other countries 
and different states, and draw upon our own economic foundation for plans 
which would be practical and would combine theory and practice” (Commons 
1902, 232). Two decades later this challenge had been largely met, at least to 
the satisfaction of  many  liberal economists. Frank W.  Taussig summarized 
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of  Economics: “A number of cities in Belgium and elsewhere have adopted the 
‘Ghent system’ (first developed in that place with apparent success) of offering 
a supplement to the trade-union unemployed benefit; .  . . the same system has 
been adopted on a national basis in Denmark and Norway” (1924,366-67). 
The ablest discussion of the Ghent system, in the major journals was by 
Rubinow (1913) in the Journal of  Political Economy. Rubinow first discussed 
a number of older European plans in which workmen could elect to insure with 
a fund run by  a city. His conclusion was that these plans suffered from two 
common insurance problems: moral hazard (workers were tempted to choose 
unemployment) and selective risks (workers who were more likely to lose their 
jobs were more likely to sign up for insurance). The Ghent system, which be- 
gan in  1900 and spread rapidly across Europe, Rubinow explained, avoided 
these problems by using the trade unions to set rules and supervise adherence. 
“It is fair to say that the Ghent system was the first successful method of or- 
ganizing social unemployment insurance” (19 13,422). 
Rubinow, however, was not satisfied with the Ghent system because it was 
restricted to trade unions and therefore excluded the most destitute workers. 
Some form of compulsory insurance, Rubinow argued, was required. 
The British system established in 1911 provided, of course, a much closer 
analogue to a nationwide state-run system of unemployment compensation. In 
1925 Newman A. Tolles provided a critical summary of the British literature 
for readers of  the Quarterly Journal  of  Economics. Tolles’s  evaluation was 
highly favorable. True, the system had to be bailed out with general funds after 
the war, but that was only because the benefits had been recklessly expanded 
just before a depression hit. The cost of the bailout was large, but the suffering 
alleviated made the cost w0rthwhi1e.I~  Maintenance of the unemployed had not 
undermined their will to work, and overall the prevention of  unemployment 
had been neither helped nor hindered. 
In discussing the British act (which provided for an array of social insurance 
besides unemployment compensation) Taussig concluded that “an extraordi- 
nary forward step was taken in the field of  social reform.” Social insurance 
would  be  expensive, but Taussig was  optimistic because “when  a country 
plunges into war,  treasure is poured out on a scale that would cover, many 
times, the expenditure needed for the contested social reforms” (1924, 367). 
The only negative reference to the British system in the major journals was 
by  Leo Wolman (1929). Wolman believed that certain aspects of the British 
system had retarded recovery from the last recession by  discouraging labor 
mobility. These features included the use of labor exchanges (which were sup- 
posed to find people jobs) to administer unemployment benefits,15  rigid defini- 
14. Despite Tolles, the perception remained that the British system had been too generous. For 
that reason, the U.S. system limited the length of time a worker was eligible (Baicker, Goldin, and 
Katz, chap. 7 in this volume). 
15. Wolman’s discussant, Squires (1929), pointed out that it would be simple enough to separate 
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tions of suitable alternative employment (which discouraged reemployment in 
expanding industries), and excessive benefits. As a model for American reform 
Wolman preferred a private, union-based  system, inaugurated in Chicago in 
1923 that covered the men’s clothing industry. In retrospect, perhaps the most 
interesting point about Wolman’s paper is that the discussion had moved far 
beyond  whether there  should be  unemployment insurance, the  subject  of 
Tuttle’s 1902 paper, to how any negative side effects could be minimized.I6 
Although the obvious precedents were the Ghent system and the British 
system of  1911, I  should note that the Soviet Union was not ignored com- 
pletely. In an article in the Journal  of  Political  Economy (anxious as always 
in those days to publish an article celebrating government intervention in the 
economy) A. Abramson (1929) reviewed social insurance in Russia. He con- 
cluded that “it must be admitted that they have certainly been successful in so 
far as social insurance is concerned” (398). 
The Civilian Conservation Corps, 1933. What evidence was there that an “in- 
dustrial reserve army” would relieve unemployment? And what evidence was 
there that it would improve the character of the young men it employed, that it 
would not be just a dole? 
Nothing like the Civilian Conservation Corps, as far as I have been able to 
determine, was discussed in the journals. Nevertheless, it is a relevant example 
of the commitment of economists to an expanded role for government because 
the idea for the Civilian Conservation Corps, according to Dorfman (1959, 
671), came from Richard T. Ely’s Hard Times: The Way In and the Way Out 
(1931). Ely was then one of the famous old men of  economics; he had been 
president of the American Economic Association in 1900-1901,  and his text- 
book Outline of Economics, first published in 1893, was still among the leaders 
in the 1930s. 
Ely’s plan was very similar to the actual Civilian Conservation Corps. His 
“industrial reserve army” would have a permanent “general staff” that in good 
times would concentrate on planning conservation projects, such as reforesta- 
tion, and would formulate its plans so that in “hard times” the industrial reserve 
army could be rapidly and indefinitely mobilized to incorporate the unem- 
ployed. The permanent general staff would earn salaries commensurate with 
administrative salaries in the private sector. But the ordinary worker would 
only earn a salary similar to base pay in the regular army. When good times 
returned, employers would simply call on the peacetime army for men, who 
would immediately be mustered out and be fit and ready to report for active 
duty in the private sector. 
Ely  was  indebted to  William James’s  ([1910]  1912) essay  “The  Moral 
Equivalent of  War” for the basic idea. James proposed a universal national 
16. Similarly, Yoder (1931) was concerned mainly with getting the incentives right, and Witmer 
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service. All young men, including especially our “gilded youth,” would be con- 
scripted and set to work, for a time, in mines, forests, and so on. In this way 
they would learn martial values, the one good thing about militarism, without 
becoming part of  a war machine. Ely’s twist was to turn James’s peacetime 
army into a countercyclical policy. 
As empirical models of successful peacetime armies Ely cited the Salvation 
Army and the Jesuits, but the most influential model was the German army 
before World War 1.l’ 
German militarism before the World War was so repellant to most thoughtful 
Americans that they generally failed to see great benefits brought to Ger- 
many through military training. I was a student in Germany for three years, 
and during various visits to Germany afterwards I was strongly impressed 
by the bright side of military training. . . .  The army was a school of many 
different kinds. Those who had not attained a certain minimum of  school 
education had regular classes to bring up their deficiencies. The discipline 
of  the army was on the whole an excellent thing. It taught order, it taught 
men to work together and to do the things that they were told to do without 
question, simply because it was their duty. Loyalty was cultivated and men 
were taught to work hard. In short it afforded a discipline of life. All of this 
was a preparation for the economic life, and was a help in making Germany 
prosperous before the War. (1 93 1, 100) 
How was the peacetime army to be financed, especially when hard times 
required a significant mobilization? Ely argued that it could be financed by 
issuing long-term government bonds. “The experience of  the World War . . . 
shows the almost undreamed of and almost limitless capacity to raise funds by 
millions and by billions when needed to save our selves from disaster” (Ely 
1931, 109). 
He added that it would be a good idea if  a reserve fund-modeled  on the 
Prussian War Chest-were  kept in Washington and the states. The president 
(the Kaiser?) could then be given the authority to declare an emergency and 
use the reserve funds for immediate mobilization (Ely 1931, 111-12). 
Ely was more frank than most would have been in citing his German inspira- 
tion. After the war any plan based on a German model could easily be attacked 
as the product of a militaristic and undemocratic state and therefore inappropri- 
ate for the United States. But at least in Ely’s case we can see a process at 
work that is familiar today: Japanese institutions are recommended because 
the economy as a whole has been successful. 
Thus, to sum up, on the eve of the depression the economics profession (or 
at least an important segment of it) was ready with an arsenal of reform plans, 
ranging from minimum wage laws to industrial reserve armies, for the New 
Deal to use in its war against the depression. The general assumption that lay 
17. Ely earned his Ph.D. at Heidelberg and was an apostle of the German historical school. 147  The Expansion of the Federal Government in the 1930s 
behind these plans was that markets frequently fail to produce socially desir- 
able results, and that the central government was normally competent to diag- 
nose and correct the problems created by unfettered markets. This assumption, 
massively reinforced by the depression itself, inevitably structured the debate 
over subsequent reforms, and constituted one of the most enduring legacies of 
the depression. 
4.4  The Postwar Era 
In the postwar era the evolution of  opinion (both professional and public) 
about the appropriate economic role of the federal government followed the 
inverse of the path described in the preceding sections. In particular, just as 
the depression of the  1930s encouraged the public to adopt the enthusiasm 
for government intervention already prevalent among leading economists, the 
stagflation of  1970s encouraged the adoption of a new skepticism about gov- 
ernment already evident among economists at an earlier date. 
4.4.1  The Continuation of the New Deal Regime, 1946-76 
The agencies and programs established in the 1930s survived and often as 
not expanded. In some cases the expansion in a particular area seemed almost 
inevitable given the initial federal commitment. 
This is well known in the cases of social security and bank deposit insur- 
ance. Another example is medical research. The National Institutes of Health 
can trace their origin to an amendment to the Social Security Act of  1937. A 
steady expansion followed in the postwar era: Mental Health (1946); Allergy 
and Infectious Disease (1948); Dental Health (1948); Heart, Lung, and Blood 
(1948); Arthritis, Metabolism, and Digestive Diseases (1950); Child Health 
and Human Development (1  962); General Medical Sciences, to cover diseases 
that did not have their own institutes (1963); Alcohol Prevention and Drug 
Abuse (1966); Environmental Health Science (1966); Eye Institute (1968); 
Aging (1974); and Neurological and Communicative Disorders (1976). 
Part of the explanation for the persistence and expansion of the institutional 
structure created in the 1930s was the interest groups created. Once in place, 
an  agency or program created a group of  constituents, whether arthritis re- 
searchers or  peanut  farmers, who  lobbied  continually for  their  program’s 
expansion, and who could be counted on to launch a vigorous counterattack 
against any attempt at curtailment. A congressman who voted to reduce or 
simply limit the spending of an agency immediately felt the wrath of the of- 
fended interest group; the benefits created by such a reduction, however, would 
be spread over a large group of taxpayers and go unnoticed and unrewarded at 
election time. 
This phenomenon has been described by Milton Friedman and Rose Fried- 
man as an “iron triangle” of beneficiaries, bureaucrats, and legislators (1984, 
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singer, Jr., sees the persistence of liberal programs as evidence that “affirmative 
government” has on balance served the public well: agencies survive because 
they do good (1986,245-48). 
But the postwar years witnessed more than the survival and expansion of the 
programs begun in the 1930s,  they also witnessed the continued dominance of 
an ideology that held that government was competent to enter new areas and 
could afford to do so,’*  that the burden of  proof was on those who opposed 
meeting problems with an expansion of government. The dominance of a lib- 
eral ideology reached its peak in the 1960s with the large number of new agen- 
cies and programs created in the Little New  Deal of  the Kennedy-Johnson 
era-the  addition of Medicare to social security, creation of the Departments 
of Transportation and Housing and Urban Development, and so on. 
Opposition to the market, if  not support for Big Government, reached its 
peak in the rebellion of college-age youths in the 1960s. The rebellion seemed 
to be a fulfillment of Schumpeter’s prediction that capitalism would undermine 
itself (1943, 146).  An increasingly large fraction of the population, Schumpeter 
argued, would go on to higher education, where it would inevitably be indoctri- 
nated in a withering criticism of capitalism developed by intellectuals. As the 
future was to show, however, the willingness of young people to act on their 
professors’ ideas would soon fade, and perhaps even more surprising, the char- 
acterization of the intellectual, or at least the economist-intellectual, as an un- 
relenting critic of the market was about to change. 
4.4.2  Crisis and Ideological Change in the 1970s 
In the 1970s we had a period of economic crisis, followed by a shift to a 
new, and in this case more conservative, ideological regime. The economic 
crisis of  the  1970s, of course, was not nearly as severe as the crisis of  the 
1930s, and partly for that reason, the shift in public opinion was not as great. 
While the 1930s could be described as a swing of the pendulum from right to 
left, the 1970s would be described as a swing from the left to the center. 
Nevertheless, there are a number of striking parallels between the 1930s and 
1970s. As in the  1930s, a macroeconomic fluctuation, best addressed, one 
would think, with macroeconomic medicines, produced pressures for medi- 
cines to deal with long-term problems in specific industries. More to the point, 
for our purposes, the shift in public opinion in the 1970s, like the shift in the 
193Os, was preceded by a shift among economists. And in the 1970s as in the 
1930s the shift in professional opinion seems to have been based to on a read- 
ing of empirical evidence. In the  1970s, however, the role of evidence from 
abroad was much less important than it had been in  1900-1929.  When pro- 
grams were merely a gleam in an American reformer’s eye, the only available 
18. Michael A. Bernstein (1994)  has argued persuasively that the consensus among economists 
in favor of active government “planning” was strongly reinforced by the prominent role that econo- 
mists played in the Office of Price Administration, the War  Production Board, and other agencies 
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evidence was from other countries that had already tried the experiment; after 
World War  I1 one could examine how New Deal reforms had worked in the 
United States. 
Much of the leadership for the shift in professional opinion came from Chi- 
cago. In  macroeconomics Milton Friedman revived monetarism, publishing 
(with Anna J. Schwartz) A Monetary History of  the United States in 1963. I 
will not pursue the impact of the monetarist revolution here, except to note that 
the fall of Keynesian macroeconomics and the rise of neoclassical macroeco- 
nomics inevitably altered the terms of debate over any proposed expansion of 
the federal government. Before the 1970s it was possible to argue that the cost 
of adding a new’agency was essentially zero or negative, except when the econ- 
omy was at full employment. In microeconomics, George Stigler, who pro- 
duced influential empirical critiques of  regulation, was the dominant figure. 
He published The Citizen and the State in 1975, collecting papers originally 
published in the 1960s and early 1970s. 
Perhaps, however, as Thomas McCraw (1984, chap. 7) has pointed out, Al- 
fred Kahn better represents the “intellectual odyssey” of the profession in the 
postwar era. Kahn entered graduate school in the late 1930s, and his early work 
on antitrust, much of it published in the 1940s and 1950s, was heavily influ- 
enced by the institutionalist tradition of Veblen, Ely, and Commons. Kahn then 
held that neoclassical microeconomics did not provide a sound basis for evalu- 
ating antitrust policies, in part because consumer preferences, the satisfaction 
of which played such a large role in neoclassical economics, were easily ma- 
nipulated. Gradually, however, Kahn’s opinions changed. His masterwork, The 
Economics of ReguZation (1970), although it did not abandon his institutional- 
ist insights or his liberal politics, made a strong case for marginal cost pricing 
and for allowing market forces to operate. In  1974 he became chairman of 
the New York Public Service Commission, which regulated utility rates. Here 
he became a national figure by  putting marginal cost pricing strategies into 
effect: for example, peak load charges for electricity and, more controversially, 
charges for directory assistance. 
In  1977 he became chairman of the Civil Aeronautics Board, and here he 
went even further in promoting market forces. Pressure for deregulation had 
been  growing for some years and had broad political support. Much of  the 
support for reform was based on the experience in California and Texas. There, 
intrastate carriers were permitted much greater latitude in setting fares, and as 
a result fares were much lower than on comparable interstate routes regulated 
by the Civil Aeronautics Board. Under Kahn the industry, which had become 
a tightly regulated cartel, was deregulated: special fares and cuts in rates were 
permitted, and new entrants were encouraged. It was the first major effort to 
deregulate an American industry. 
In the pre-1939 period we had no way of knowing the opinions of the “silent 
majority” of economists. The best that I could offer was the argument that the 
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tent, by  the articles appearing in the leading professional journals and that in 
any case what mattered most was the opinion of  the “weighty” economists 
who wrote for those journals. In the postwar era we can learn something more 
from opinion polls. 
Alston, Kearl, and Vaughan (1992) surveyed a stratified sample of  1,350 
economists. Most relevant for our purpose is the breakdown by vintage-year 
in which they received their highest degrees. The change in macroeconomic 
ideas was the most dramatic: 9.4 percent of  economists who received their 
highest degrees before 1961 agreed that “the macro economy is generally self- 
correcting”; but 27.5 percent of those who received their highest degrees be- 
tween 1971 and 1980 agreed. On the microeconomic side the change was less 
dramatic, although still clearly present: 55.6 percent of the pre-1961 vintage 
agreed that a “minimum wage increases unemployment”; but 66.7 percent of 
the 1971-80  vintage agreed. Agreement with “marginal tax rates impact work 
effort” was  14.8 percent for the pre-1961 vintage, but 27.3 percent for the 
197  1-80  vintage. Agreement with “income redistribution is legitimate” was 
64.2 percent for the pre-1961 vintage, but only 47.3 percent for the 1971-80 
vintage. There appears to have been, it is interesting to note, a slight swing to 
the left for the 1981-90  vintage, presaging perhaps, a swing in public opinion. 
The Reagan administration hoped to attack the New Deal all along the line, 
by cutting taxes and government spending, as well as cutting government regu- 
lation. But its successes were limited (Higgs 1987, 255-56;  Hughes  1991, 
205-7).  Tax  rates were cut, and there was additional deregulation (most of 
which was already in the pipeline) in communications, transportation, and fi- 
nancial services. But the administration’s efforts to cut expenditure programs 
fizzled when proposed cuts were attacked by outraged constituencies and their 
congressional supporters. David Stockman, who drew up the list of proposed 
cuts, described the process in The Triumph of Politics (1986). Perhaps the main 
legacy of  the Reagan Revolution was ideological: the shift in the burden of 
proof from those who oppose federal solutions to economic and social pro- 
grams to those who favor them, something to be measured by the relative pau- 
city of new programs since the 1980s, rather than by the elimination of older 
ones. 
4.5  Ideology as Explanation 
In the decades prior to the Great Depression microeconomists championed 
a wide range of  social and economic reforms such as minimum wages, old- 
age pensions, unemployment compensation, large-scale public works to cure 
unemployment, industrial armies to be mobilized in depressions, and so on. 
When the Great Depression created a uniquely receptive political environment, 
those reforms were adopted, permanently altering the role of the central gov- 
ernment. 
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expansion of government? Undoubtedly, the economists were responding to a 
range of  social and political forces that lay outside their discipline. Empirical 
evidence developed by economists, however, was important in converting the 
profession to a liberal (in the American sense) view of the role of government 
in the economy. American economists were influenced by the apparent success 
of government economic intervention in a wide range of countries, including 
Germany, Belgium, Russia, and the Scandinavian countries. Perhaps most im- 
portant, however, were experiments in English-speaking countries-  Australia, 
Canada, Great Britain, New Zealand, and the United States. This was sensible. 
Experiments in wartime economies, in Russia, even in Germany, as persuasive 
as they were to many, did not hold enough things constant to persuade the skep- 
tical. 
In retrospect there is nothing  unique in the influence traced in this paper. 
Who can doubt that in recent decades the attitude of  economists toward the 
role of the state has been influenced powerfully by natural experiments such 
as East Germany versus West Germany or mainland China versus the “tigers” 
of Southeast Asia, and by the economic success of  Japan? 
The growth  of  the federal bureaucracy  in the 1930s illustrates  the point 
made recently by a number of economic historians (Higgs 1987; Fogel 1989; 
North 1990) that major changes in economic institutions cannot be understood 
without taking ideology and ideological change into account. The history of 
economic thought, I believe, provides a lens for bringing the ideological di- 
mension of economic change into focus. 
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